Entry has long been recognized to be an important part of many auction processes, but existing results on auctions with entry apply primarily to a set of notable but restrictive special cases. We consider a more general approach based on a model which places minimal restrictions on bidders' pre-entry information, and which thereby permits entry to be arbitrarily selective. Within this environment, we consider a general class of auction mechanisms, characterize symmetric equilibrium in these mechanisms, and extend the classic revenue equivalence results of Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between optimal policy and eciency in this environment, and show that Levin and Smith (1994) 's nding that revenue maximization implies eciency applies only in the polar case of nonselective entry.
Introduction
Entry is a quantitatively and qualitatively important aspect of many real-world auction processes, but theoretical analysis of auctions with entry has to date been limited to a few notable but restrictive special cases. Two paradigmatic examples in the literature are Samuelson (1985) (henceforth S), who proposes a simultaneous entry model in which potential bidders know their valuations ex ante but must incur a xed cost to submit bids, and Levin and Smith (1994) (henceforth LS) , who consider simultaneous entry under the alternative assumption that bidders learn their valuations after incurring the xed cost. A common theme in this literature is that dierent assumptions on entry can produce very dierent practical and policy conclusions. For example, under the LS model a revenue-maximizing seller will set a zero reserve price and maximize social welfare, whereas in the S model revenue maximization requires a binding, socially inecient reserve price. Hence while the existing literature contains many important insights on auctions with entry, it permits few overarching theoretical and policy conclusions. This paper seeks to generalize existing work on auctions with entry using a framework we call the Aliated Signal (AS) model. First suggested by Ye (2007) , the AS model assumes that potential bidders receive imperfect signals of their valuations prior to entry, make simultaneous entry decisions based on these signals, then learn their valuations and submit bids. This structure imposes minimal a priori restrictions on pre-entry information, requiring only that signals and values be aliated in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982) (so that higher signals are good news). It also includes both the S and LS models as polar cases: the former when signals and values are perfectly correlated, and the latter when signals and values are independent. The AS model thus represents an ideal basis for a general theoretical analysis of auctions with entry.
Building on the general AS entry model, the paper makes the following specic contributions. We consider IPV auction environments with AS entry, focusing on a class of mechanisms we call RS auctions (after Riley and Samuelson (1981) ).
1 For this class of auctions, we establish the following four results. First, we characterize equilibrium entry and bidding behavior induced by any auction in the class considered. Second, building on this result, we establish a generalized revenue equivalence theorem applicable to auctions with general AS entry. Third, we characterize eciency in auctions with AS entry, and show that the seller's optimal auction is inecient in general; that is, that Levin and Smith (1994) 's 1 Roughly, mechanisms such that only the high bidder has a positive probability of award, and the probability of award depends only on the highest bid.
nding that revenue maximization implies eciency applies only to the polar case of LS entry. Finally, we explore revenue-maximizing reservation prices and entry fees directly, and establish that these will be positive in the regular case where potential bidders prefer lower costs of entry. These ndings have potentially important implications for welfare and policy analysis in auctions with entry, and to our knowledge none have been established at the level of generality we consider.
This study is related to a large and growing literature on the theory and empirics of auctions with entry. The empirical branch of this literature includes studies establishing the importance of entry in a wide range of applications: Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) in online auctions, Hendricks, Pinske, and Porter (2003) in outer continental shelf wildcat auctions, Li and Zheng (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009) in highway construction procurement auctions, and Li and Zheng (2012) , Li and Zhang (2010) , Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) and others in timber auctions, to mention just a few. The theoretical literature also contains a number of notable contributions not yet mentioned. McAfee and McMillan (1987) explore a model of sequential entry where entry is interpreted as value discovery; this value-discovery paradigm has been adopted by much of the subsequent entry literature, though these studies typically consider simultaneous rather than sequential entry. More recent work by Lu (2008 Lu ( , 2009a Lu ( ,b, 2010 and Moreno and Wooders (2011) extends the basic LS entry model to incorporate heterogeneous entry costs; Lu characterizes equilibrium, eciency, and optimal auction design in this extended model, while Moreno and Wooders note that the presence of private entry costs overturns core eciency results in Levin and Smith (1994) . Finally, Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2007) , Gentry and Li (2011) , and Roberts and Sweeting (2010b,a) explore specication testing, nonparametric identication, and an empirical application of the general AS model respectively. This study provides a theoretical complement to this recent application-oriented work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the structure of the AS model, and Section 3 characterizes symmetric equilibrium entry and bidding behavior under any RS auction rules. Section 4 establishes revenue equivalence in the class of auctions considered. Section 5 establishes that the seller's optimal auction will in general be inecient, and Section 6 explores revenue-maximizing policy directly. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The AS model
We consider allocation of a single indivisible good among N potential bidders via a two-stage auction mechanism M , where bidders have independent private values for the good being sold. Timing of the auction game is as follows. First, in Stage 1, each potential bidder i observes a private signal s i of her (unknown) private value v i , and all potential bidders simultaneously choose whether to enter the auction. Each entering bidder must pay an entry cost c; this may be interpreted as the net of opportunity, learning, and bid preparation costs.
Then, in Stage 2, the n bidders who chose to enter in Stage 1 learn their true values v i and submit bids for the object being sold. Finally, auction outcomes are determined according to the rules of the mechanism M , which are common knowledge to all participants. Consistent with institutional features common to many ocial procurement lettings, we assume that bidders observe the number of potential bidders N prior to entry, but do not observe the number of entrants n prior to bidding.
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We frame our analysis in terms of a general class of mechanisms we call RS auctions (after the work of Riley and Samuelson (1981) ): Denition 1. A RS auction is any bidding mechanism having the following properties:
1. Mechanism rules are anonymous.
2. If award is made, it is to the bidder submitting the highest bid.
3. The probability of award depends only on the highest bid.
2 Allowing bidders to observe n prior to bidding would slightly change the details of the derivation, but would not substantially alter any of our core results. The class of RS auctions includes all four standard auctions (rst-price, Vickery, English ascending, and Dutch), plus many less common auction types. It therefore represents a natural focal point for our current investigation.
We formalize the remaining assumptions of the AS entry model as follows. Assumption 1. The seller and all potential bidders are risk-neutral. Assumption 2. All bidders are ex ante symmetric, and draw value-signal pairs (V, S) independently from a continuous joint distribution f (v, s) satisfying the following properties:
The marginal density of second-stage values (f(V )) has positive support on a bounded interval [v,v] .
(ii) WLOG, we normalize rst-stage signals S to have a uniform marginal distribu-
(iii) For each bidder i, the random variablesV i and S i are aliated in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
Assumption 3. Information structure:
(i) Each bidder i observes own signal s i prior to entry, but does not learn own value v i until after entry.
(ii) The number of potential bidders N is known to all participants, but the number of entrants n is not revealed until the auction concludes.
Assumption 4. The second-stage auction mechanism M and all other model fundamentals are common knowledge.
Assumption 4 (common knowledge) is entirely standard, Assumption 1 (risk neutrality) is strong but typical in the auction literature, and the signal normalization 2(ii) is feasible since any monotone transformation of a signal preserves information. The aliation assumption 2(iii) formalizes the sense in which a higher signal is good news, but otherwise imposes minimal restrictions on the nature of selection; in particular, it nests both the S model (perfect dependence) and the LS model (independence) as polar cases. Leaving n unobserved prior to bidding diers slightly from the corresponding assumption in Levin and Smith (1994) , but is motivated by institutional features typical of many real-world auctions and in any event is entirely incidental to our core results.
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Finally, as usual, we frame our theoretical analysis in terms of direct mechanisms; by the Revelation Principle, any mechanism has an equivalent direct mechanism, so this is without loss of generality (see Krishna (2009) (ii) A low-type bidder (entrant with value v) weakly prefers less Stage 2 competition.
(iii) WLOG, the mechanism M is specied such that when N − 1 potential rivals
, the payment of a potential bidder reporting value
where ρ(z −i ) is a symmetric function and reports z −i incorporate the possibility of non-entry.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard and satised by almost all mechanisms used in practice. Condition (iii) may look restrictive at rst glance, but is actually without loss of generality since it applies only to out-of-equilibrium reports z i ≤ v. This latter fact is important in ensuring the generality of our results, so we state it formally as a lemma:
Lemma 1. Any RS auction satisfying Assumptions 1-5(ii) is payo-and performanceequivalent to some RS auction also satisfying Assumption 5(iii). Example 2. Consider a second-price auction with a secret reserve price r ∼ F r (·) and an entry fee e > 0. This structure can be nested under Assumption 5 by setting α(y) = F r (y) and ρ(z −i ) = 0 for all z −i .
Equilibrium
Since bidders are ex ante symmetric by hypothesis, we focus on the class of symmetric, subgame perfect, pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium of this form involves two components: a Stage 1 entry set S * such that enter if s i ∈ S * is optimal given equilibrium continuation play, and a Stage 2 bidding function β(v; S) (monotonic in its rst argument) such that an entrant with value v i optimally submits bid β(v i ; S) in response to N − 1 rivals who enter according to S and bid according to β(·; S). We restrict attention to RS auctions, so by denition β(·; S) exists and is unique for any nonempty entry set S. 
By hypothesis, the equilibrium bid function β(·;s) is monotonic in its rst argument. An entrant with value v will thus win against potential rival j in one of two events: either j does not enter, or j enters but draws a value less than v. Let F * w (v;s) denote the joint probability of these events:
We will frequently reference stochastic ordering of the distributions F * (v; s) and F * w (v; s) in s, so we formally establish these orderings via the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any (v; s) and any s ≥ s, the ex-post value distribution F * (v; ·) satises
and the ex-post win probability distribution F * w (v; ·) satises
In other words, F * (·; s ) rst-order stochastically dominates F * (·; s), and F stochastically dominates F * w (·; s ).
The form of the equilibrium bidding function β(·;s) will obviously depend on the rules of the mechanism M . However, via standard arguments in mechanism design, we can characterize expected Stage 2 prot in any RS auction as follows.
Proposition 1. In any symmetric Stage 2 equilibrium of any RS mechanism, the expected Stage 2 prot of an entrant with value v facing N − 1 potential rivals who enter according to thresholds is given by
where the constants ρ 1 , ..., ρ N denote expected payments of an entrant with value v when exactly n = 1, ..., N bidders enter and 
where the second line follows from Proposition 1 and the third follows from integration by parts. The key properties of this ex ante prot function are stated in the following lemma. 
This function is weakly increasing in s i for all (s, N ), strictly decreasing ins for all (s i , N ), and strictly decreasing in N for all s i and anys < 1.
Bidder i will choose to enter whenever expected net prot from entry is positive, i.e. whenever Π(s i ;s) ≥ c.
This fact in turn implies a breakeven condition which must hold at any candidate interior thresholds ∈ (0, 1):
that is, a bidder drawing signal S i =s must be indierent to entry when facing N − 1 potential rivals who also enter according tos.
Finally, note that that any Stage 1 equilibrium can be represented in threshold form. To see this, rst generalize the expected Stage 2 prot function in Equation 5 to an arbitrary entry set S:
Aliation implies that F (v|s) is decreasing in s for all v, so Π(s i ; S) will be (weakly) increasing in its rst argument. Hence, if S is an equilibrium, we must have Π(s, S) ≥ Π(min(S); S) ≥ c for every s ≥ min(S). If either inequality is strict, it will be optimal for a bidder with signal s to enter, so we must have s ∈ S * . Otherwise, we can replace min(S) with s to obtain a new entry set S which is payo-and performance-equivalent to S, and iterating this argument will eventually produce an equivalent threshold set.
We combine these arguments to establish Proposition 2, which formally characterizes Stage 1 equilibrium.
Proposition 2. A symmetric entry equilibrium in the AS model is characterized by a signal thresholds such that only bidders with s i ≥s choose to enter. This signal threshold is uniquely determined as follows.
• If Π(0; 0) > c, thens = 0 and all potential bidders always enter.
• If Π(1; 1) < c, thens = 0 and no potential bidder ever enters.
• Otherwise, the signal thresholds satises the breakeven condition
where Π(s i ;s) is dened as in Lemma 3.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the AS model under any Stage 2 RS auction.
Revenue equivalence
By denition, ex ante expected seller revenue in mechanism M under entry structure (s, N )
is the dierence between total social welfare and surplus accruing to bidders at (s, N ): 
where for ease of exposition we assume ρ(
is the expectation of this function with respect to the distribution F * w (v; s) less expected entry costs at (s, N ); that is, the ex ante expected prot of an arbitrary potential entrant:
Again, note that this function depends on Π * We thus extend the classic equivalence results of Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to the case of endogenous and selective AS entry.
Revenue maximization and eciency
In this section we study the relationship between revenue maximization and social eciency in the class of RS auctions with AS entry. This investigation is motivated by a key result of Levin and Smith (1994) : when bidders enter without selection, a revenue-maximizing seller will also maximize social welfare. We show that this conclusion applies only in the polar LS case: in the broader AS model, the seller will generally prefer an inecient mechanism. For current purposes, we focus on two policy instruments: a public reserve price r and an entry fee e. For simplicity, we also normalize v 0 = 0.
First consider social welfare at an arbitrary entry threshold s. Specializing the arguments in the last section, we obtain
A binding reserve price r > v is obviously inecient, and a nonbinding reserve price r ∈ (0, v] can always be oset by an appropriate entry fee. Hence we can set r = 0 WLOG, and characterize the ecient auction via only choice of e.
Rearranging Equation 8 via integration by parts and substituting using the denition of G * 1:N (y; s, N ) produces the following equivalent representation for social welfare at threshold s:
It can be shown that this function is concave in s. Social welfare is thus maximized at a thresholdŝ satisfying the necessary and sucient rst-order condition
Lets e be the entry threshold corresponding to entry fee e. By Proposition 2,s e satiseŝv
Setting e = 0 thus ensures´v 0 F * Proposition 4 (Eciency). Social welfare is maximized when the seller sets no reserve price or entry fee: settingr = 0 andê = 0 produces socially optimal entry. Now let m = (e, r) be the seller's policy choice, and consider the seller's revenue maximization problem. By denition, seller revenue is the dierence between social surplus and expected prots among potential bidders, which with slight abuse of notation we write as follows:
By construction, the seller's optimal policy m * satises
Meanwhile, the social optimumm satises
Since bidders earn positive expected prots when entry is selective, the RHS of Equation (11) will not be zero in general. Hence the seller's optimal policy need not correspond to the social optimum. We state this result formally as a lemma:
Lemma 4. In general, a revenue-maximizing seller will not maximize social welfare.
As noted above, this result contrasts with the corresponding nding in Levin and Smith (1994) . Intuitively, when potential bidders have no private information, entry will involve mixed strategies and potential bidders will compete away all prots. Hence Π * (m) will be identically zero for all m, so R * (m) ≡ W * (m) and a revenue-maximizing seller will maximize total surplus. In contrast, when entry is selective, Π * (m) > 0 in general, and a revenuemaximizing seller will induce distortion to capture part of this additional surplus. The welfare results of Levin and Smith (1994) thus depend crucially on the particular informational assumptions of the LS model, and in general do not apply outside that polar case.
6 Revenue-maximizing policy
The last section proceeded via negation, rst characterizing the socially ecient auction, then noting that in general a revenue-maximizing seller will not choose this auction. This section proceeds more positively, rst characterizing revenue-maximizing choices of the seller's policy variables e and r, then deriving conditions under which these will be positive.
Seller's optimal entry fee
Set r = 0, and consider second-price auctions without loss of generality. Proposition 2 implies a one-to-one correspondence between the entry fee e and the equilibrium entry threshold s, so we can derive optimal policy in terms of either. We thus consider maximization of expected revenue corresponding to threshold s: 
where the rst term gives total surplus (see Equation (9)) and the second term gives total prot among potential bidders. In the regular case where potential bidders strictly prefer lower total entry costs, the second term will be decreasing in s. 
The rst line of R * s (s) is negative, zero, or positive as s ŝ, the second line is always positive, and the third line is always negative. Hence R * s (s) may be either positive or negative atŝ, but will not be zero in general.
If potential bidders strictly prefer lower total cost of entry, the sum of the last two lines will be positive and a revenue-maximizing seller will choose e * > 0.
Finally, for completeness, we specialize Proposition 5 to the S and LS polar cases. 
Further, R * y (ŷ) > 0 at the social optimumŷ, so the seller always prefers less than ecient entry. 
The RHS of this expression is identical to the last two terms of Equation (12) Proposition 6 (Seller's optimal reserve price). Suppose the seller's only policy variable is r. Then the seller will set a positive reserve price if
If potential bidders prefer lower total entry costs, this condition will be satised and the seller will optimally set r * > 0.
Finally, as above, we specialize Proposition 6 to the polar cases of S and LS entry.
Corollary 3 (Optimal reserve price, LS case). Suppose LS entry obtains (bidders have no prior information on own values). Then the seller optimally choosesr * = 0 and induces socially optimal entry.
Proof. Levin and Smith (1994) 
Further, r * > 0 and the seller induces less than optimal entry.
Proof. r * > 0 follows from Proposition 6 plus Corollary 2. The rst-order condition is derived in the Appendix.
Conclusion
This study proposes a general analysis of auctions with entry based on a framework we call the Aliated-Signal (AS) model. From a theoretical perspective, this framework has several major advantages: it relaxes existing restrictions on pre-entry information, permits endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry, and nests several leading special cases in the literature. The AS model thus represents an ideal basis for a general theoretical approach to auctions with entry.
Within this general AS entry framework, we focus on the broad class of mechanisms considered by Riley and Samuelson (1981) : roughly, auctions such that award (if made) is only to the high bidder. For this class of auctions, we establish the following four results.
First, we characterize equilibrium entry and bidding behavior in the AS model under general RS auction rules. Second, we extend the classic revenue equivalence results of Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to auctions with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. Third, we characterize ecient entry in the AS model, and show that a revenue-maximizing seller will in general induce suboptimal entry decisions. Finally, we explore revenue-maximizing policy in the AS model, and derive conditions under which the seller will prefer positive reservation prices and entry fees. While some of these results were available for special cases of our model, to our knowledge none have been established at the level of generality we consider.
Our ndings on eciency in particular contrast sharply with those of Levin and Smith (1994) , and this contrast is worth discussing further in the context of the literature. Levin and Smith (1994) study entry under two key assumptions: that all potential bidders face the same entry cost, and that potential bidders have no specic information on own values prior to entry. Under these assumptions, entry is in mixed strategies, the seller captures all auction gains, and the revenue-maximizing auction is thus by denition ecient. Recent work by Moreno and Wooders (2011) has established that the rst assumption is pivotal: if potential bidders have private entry costs, the revenue-maximizing auction will in general be inecient.
This study establishes that the second is also pivotal. Taken together with the work of Moreno and Wooders (2011) , our ndings thus suggest that the Levin and Smith result is best considered a corner case: coincidence between revenue maximization and eciency is not a general consequence of entry, but rather arises only very special assumptions. This observation in turn has potentially important implications for both policy design and welfare analysis.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (following Krishna (2009) ). WLOG, restrict attention to direct mechanisms with equilibria such that participants truthfully report types. In particular, let M be an arbitrary direct mechanism involving allocation rule Q(v; E) and payment rule P (v; E),
where v is a vector of (realized) bidder values and E ≡ (s, N ) is an entry structure, and let
the corresponding (expected) allocation and payment functions facing bidder i.
Now consider an arbitrary bidder with value v i ∈ V , and note that by construction the mechanism α(·) permits bidders to report any signal z in Z = [0,v] . Thus for truth-telling to be an equilibrium, we must have
It follows that π(v i ; E) is the maximum of a family of ane functions, which in turn implies that π(·; E) is a convex function on V .
By the Integral Form Envelope Theorem (see Milgrom (2004) ), this restriction in turn implies that any incentive-compatible direct mechanism must yield equilibrium bidder prot π(·; E) of the form
where π 0 (E) is the (mechanism-determined) prot of the lowest entering bidder. Now consider RS auctions specically. By Denition 1, the probability of allocation to an entering bidder with value y is
where W j ≡ 1[s j ≥s] · v j is the realized value of bidder j. Corresponding low-type prots
where p 0 (E) are mechanism-determined expected payments of a low-type bidder given entry structure E. Proof of Lemma 1. Let M be any RS mechanism satisfying Assumptions 1-5, and suppose that M involves award rule α(·) and induces low-type payment p 0 (z −i ).
By construction ofρ(z −i ),p(·) induces the same realized low-type payments as p 0 (·) under truthful revelation:p
It remains only to show thatp(·) induces truthful revelation from an entrant with type v.
The initial mechanism induced an equilibrium, so z i > v cannot be optimal. For z i ≤ v, the new mechanism induces prot
The derivative of this function with respect to the report z is
Thus a low-type bidder can do no better than to report z i ≡ v. Equivalence ofp(z; z −i ) with p 0 (z −i ) then follows immediately from above.
Proof. Consider rst the social optimum when r = 0. By denition, social welfare at entry thresholds is the expected value of the object to the highest bidder less total expected entry costs:
where the third line follows from integration by parts and the last line follows by denition of G *
1:N (·).
Dierentiating this expression with respect tos yields a FOC characterizing socially optimal entry s * :
Lets e be the entry threshold corresponding to entry fee e. By Proposition 2,s e satiseŝv 
where the rst term represents expected total surplus (see Equation (13)) and the second represents net prot accruing to inframarginal bidders.
Dierentiating this expression yields the necessary FOC for the seller's optimal threshold
In the regular case, net bidder prot should be decreasing in total entry costs. In this case, total bidder prots will also be decreasing in the entry threshold s (since e and s are monotonically related), so the derivative of the second term will be negative. We know (from 4) that the rst term vanishes at the social optimumŝ. Hence in the regular case we expect
entry cost for all possible fundamentals. Consequently, we derive an explicit form for R * s (s)
as well:
where the second and fourth lines of the rst equality cancel since ∂ ∂s F * (y; s) ≡ ∂ ∂s
We thus obtain R * s (s) given in Lemma 5. By construction, the seller's optimal threshold will satisfy R * s (s * ) ≡ 0, but without being able to sign the derivative of bidder prot the relationship of s * toŝ may be ambiguous in general.
Proof of Corollary 2. Though Corollary 2 is a special case of Lemma 5, the special features of the S model make it easier to establish directly. Entry in the S model will involve a value thresholdȳ such that bidder i will enter if and only if v i ≥ȳ. 
As above, seller revenue corresponding to thresholdȳ is the expected value of the secondhighest entrant plus total expected entry fees:
where the second equality follows since in the S case
Dierentiating R * (ȳ) and simplifying yields:
The seller's optimum y * will satisfy R * y (y * ) ≡ 0. Meanwhile, from Proposition 4 we know the social optimumŷ satisesŷF (ŷ) N −1 ≡ c, so we must have R * y (ŷ) ≥ 0. We thus conclude y * =ŷ in general, and under standard regularity conditions we will have y * >ŷ. As in the proof of Proposition 5, we frame the problem as a choice of the optimal entry threshold: R * (s) ≡ R(r(s), s), where r(s) is the reserve price inducing equilibrium entry s. We obtain R r (r, s) and R s (r, s) directly from above: We could combine all these elements to obtain an explicit form for the seller's FOC, but in general this condition is likely to be unwieldy and unintuitive. We therefore focus instead on the derivative atŝ. By Proposition 4, we know r(ŝ) ≡ 0, so the relevant terms are Inspection reveals that this expression is identical to the last two terms of Equation (12) of Proposition 5. Hence the seller can gain by setting a positive reserve price under the same conditions that the seller can gain by setting a positive entry fee. By the argument in the proof of Proposition 5, a sucient condition for such gain to be feasible is for potential bidders to strictly prefer lower total entry costs.
Proof of Corollary 4. By arguments similar to those in the proofs of Proposition 6 and Corol- Again proceeding as in Corollary 2, we nd thatȳ is related to r by the breakeven condition:
(ȳ − r)F (ȳ) N −1 ≡ c.
Taking appropriate partial and total derivatives, we thus conclude Finally, putting everything together yields the FOC given:
